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ABSTRACT  
 
 
The American University in Cairo 
 
 
 
Islamic Law and Women’s rights:  
Questioning the Validity of the Reservations Invoking Islamic Law to the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
 
By  
Malak Khalil 
 
Supervised By 
Dr. Lana Baydas 
 
 
This thesis will attempt to demonstrate that the reservations invoking Islamic law to 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) are invalid. Reservations to human rights treaties in general are 
problematic, because these ones not only govern the relationship between States, but 
they also govern the relationship between the State and its citizens. Thus, finding a 
balance between state sovereignty, the pillar of international law and the rights of the 
people remains a challenge in the international arena. Another dimension of the 
argument is analyzing the validity of claiming Islamic law as a basis for reservations 
to CEDAW. Islamic law will be presented as a flexible and evolving field, open to 
interpretation. Therefore, arising incompatibility between the law and international 
standards of women’s rights is entrenched in the interpretation of it, not in its absolute 
articulation. Finally, to offer a practical overview of the issue, the cases of Egypt, 
Tunisia and Saudi Arabia will be illustrated to prove how the formulation of Islamic 
law within domestic systems differs, and how these diverse applications depend on 
the social and cultural contexts. Thus, the reservations made to CEDAW are justified 
by the social system, which is infiltrated in the formulation of the law. In order to 
promote and protect women’s rights while overcoming the challenges of the 
international legal order, as well as the abuses of rights wrongly justified by religion, 
Muslim women need to voice their demands. To initiate this process, the role of civil 
society is essential in raising awareness about the issue, and in pushing for reform.  
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I. Introduction 
Women’s Rights and Islam are at the core of heated debate and controversy. Some 
scholars argue that a secular set of laws is the only mean to safeguard gender equality, 
while others consider Islamic law to promote and protect women’s rights.1 This 
debate is mirrored in the international arena, where countries that follow Islamic law 
(Shari’a) have refused to be bound by provisions of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) claiming that 
Islamic law is not compatible with certain rights stipulated in the treaty. 
To what extent can these reservations be considered valid? 
This thesis will attempt to show that invoking Islamic law per se is not a valid 
justification for such reservations. It is the interpretation of the law and its operation 
within a patriarchal social system that seem to undermine the protection of women’s 
rights. Thus, these reservations can be regarded as contradicting the “object and 
purpose” of CEDAW, as articulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1969.
2
 
The thesis is divided into five main chapters.After the introduction, Chapter 
two offers a general legal framework to the issue of reservations to human rights 
treaties, it also tackles the question of “object and purpose,”3 which is an essential part 
of the argument presented.  
In the third chapter a focus is made on CEDAW and the reservations invoking 
Islamic law. It will be made clear that these ones are broad and lack explanation in 
proving how Shari’a is not compatible with the reserved provisions.  
                                               
1 See, Amira Mashhour, Islamic Law and Gender Equality-Could There be a Common Ground?: A 
Study of Divorce and Polygamy in Sharia Law and Contemporary Legislation in Tunisia and Egypt, 27 
HUM. RTS. Q. 563, 563-595 (2005). 
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.19, Jan 27, 1980 U.N.T.S. 1155. 
3 Id. 
 2 
Thus, Chapter four offers an overview of Islamic law and its stance 
concerning women’s rights to emphasize the role of reasoning in the field and the 
permanent possibility of interpretation, which seems to offer a counter-argument to 
most of the reservations made by Islamic countries.  
Finally, case studies will be illustrated in the last chapter. Egypt, Tunisia and 
Saudi Arabia offer three different applications of Shari’a in national systems. The 
case of Egypt is used as an example of a moderate application of Islamic law, an 
application that is interpreted through judicial means, trying to balance between the 
traditional and the modern views of Islamic law. Tunisia, which does not invoke 
Islamic law in its reservations, seems to support the idea that Islam can be compatible 
with women’s rights; it offers a progressive application of the law. And finally, Saudi 
Arabia follows a literal and traditional application of Shari’a, which, as it argues, 
supports its general reservation to the Convention, a reservation that questions its 
willingness to comply with its international obligation.  
These cases highlight the contrasts in the application of the law, which renders 
the reservation claiming “Shari’a” void of meaning. Countries should specify which 
“Shari’a” they follow and offer detailed reports to the Committee so as to validate 
their reservations. By doing so, not only will these ones be limited in number, but 
those that will successfully prove incompatibility with Islamic principles will initiate 
a dialogue, a dialogue among Islamic scholars that will definitely be beneficial, not 
only in understanding Islamic law, but also in increasing awareness among Muslim 
societies, and Muslim women. 
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II. Reservations under International Law 
These first pages will attempt to offer a general legal framework to the main question 
as presented in the introduction. The first chapter is concerned with the reservation 
regime, as it is practiced in the international arena. It will emphasize the unique aspect 
of human rights treaties in that respect. 
 
A. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  
As partly codified customary international law, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties constitutes a strong framework to treaty law. The latter being a source 
of international law, is supported by the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which 
requires states to act in good faith and to fulfil the obligations to which they consented 
to be bound by.
4
 
 
1. Defining reservations 
According to Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
“Reservation” means the unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a 
State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it 
purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in 
their application to that State.
5
 
 
A State is therefore able to ratify an international treaty and to refuse to be 
bound by certain provisions. As Malcolm Shaw notes it, “the capacity of a state to 
make reservations to an international treaty illustrates the principle of sovereignty of 
states.”6 As a matter of fact, the idea of state consent, which derives from sovereignty, 
is the main characteristic and the basis of international law.  
                                               
4 MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 811 (Cambridge University Press 2003) (1947). 
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.2, Jan 27, 1980 U.N.T.S. 1155. 
6 SHAW, supra note 4, at 822. 
 4 
It is important to highlight the difference between reservations and international 
statements (such as understandings or interpretative declarations). “In the latter 
instance, no binding consequence is intended with regard to the treaty in question. 
What is involved is a political manifestation for primarily internal effect that is not 
binding upon other parties.”7 Yet, ‘qualified’ interpretative declarations (as opposed 
to ‘mere’ interpretative declarations) might, in certain cases, have the same legal 
effects as reservations.
8
 
 
2. Permissibility of Reservations 
Although states can make reservations, these ones are governed by certain conditions, 
which are specifically mentioned in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Article 19 of the Convention stipulates that: 
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a 
treaty, formulate a reservation unless: 
(a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty; 
(b) The treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include 
the reservation in question, may be made; or 
(c) In cases not falling under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
9
 
 
In other words, if the treaty in question does not forbid its members to make 
reservations, then states are free to make them as long as they are compatible with 
“the object and purpose” of the convention. In theory, the conditions above seem to 
limit the number of reservations and to ensure that the integrity of a treaty be 
protected. Yet, in practice, the concept of “object and purpose” includes two main 
complexities. On one hand, it is a very general criteria validating a reservation and so 
difficult to define. On the other hand, defining the concept is left to members states. 
And in numerous instances, states have opposing views on whether a reservation 
                                               
7 Id. 
8 SHAW, supra note 4, at 823. 
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.19, Jan 27, 1980 U.N.T.S. 1155. 
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contradicts the “object and purpose” of a convention or not. In that respect, the 
question of permissibility becomes more complex. Shaw argues that the effect of 
impermissible reservations remains an open issue “one school of thought takes the 
view that such reservations are invalid and the other that the validity of any 
reservation is dependent upon acceptance by other states.”10 Concerning the first 
point, Shaw highlights the fact that “a further problem is to determine when these 
conditions under which reservations may be deemed to be impermissible have been 
met. This is especially difficult where it is contended that the object and purpose of a 
treaty have been offended. The question is also raised by the authority able to make 
such a determination.”11 The second school of thought holds that the permissibility of 
a reservation depends on its acceptance by other state members to the convention. 
Concerning acceptance and objection to reservations,
12
 Article 20 of the Vienna 
Convention states that: 
1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any 
subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so 
provides. 
2. When it appears from the limited number of negotiating states and the 
object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entire 
between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to 
be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all parties. 
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization 
and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the 
competent organ of that organization. 
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty 
otherwise provides: 
(a) acceptance by another contracting state of a reservation constitutes the 
reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when the 
treaty in force for those States; 
(b) an objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not preclude 
the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States 
unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting States; 
                                               
10 SHAW, supra note 4, at 828. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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(c) An act expressing a State’s consent to be bound by the treaty and 
containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting 
State has accepted the reservation.
13
 
 
The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion on the 
Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, which has reformed the reservation 
regime and has supported the doctrine of “universality”, complements the 
understanding of the above article. 
 
3. The ICJ Advisory Opinion on “The Reservations to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”14 
Antonio Cassese, world-leading academic and former judge and president of the UN 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, clearly presents the 
importance of the advisory opinion concerning the reservations to the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. He argues that a new 
reservation regime was introduced by this Opinion:  
Traditionally, (…) reservations had to be accepted by all other contracting 
parties for the reserving State to become bound by the treaty. The principle of 
unanimity favoured the ‘integrity of treaties’ (…). This old regulation of 
reservations proved to be totally inadequate when membership in the 
international community increased, the more so because the newcomers 
belonged to political, economic, and cultural areas different from those of 
Western Christian countries. The very liberal doctrine of ‘universality of 
treaties’ came therefore to be upheld. Thus, a regime was envisaged, first in 
the important Advisory Opinion delivered in 1951 by the ICJ on Reservations 
to the Convention on Genocide and then in the 1969 Vienna Convention.
15
  
 
On November 16
th
 1950, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution 
seeking the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion about questions 
concerning the permissibility of making reservations. This request emerged after 
                                               
13 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.20, Jan 27, 1980 U.N.T.S. 1155. 
14 Reservations to the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion, 1951 (May 28), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/10855.pdf (last visited 
May 15, 2007).  
15 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 131 (Oxford University Press 2001) (2001). 
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member states to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide objected to reservations made by other parties.
16
 The three main questions 
presented to the Court were: 
I- Can the reserving State be regarded as being a party to the Convention while 
still maintaining its reservation if the reservation is objected to by one or more 
of the parties to the Convention but not by others?  
II- If the answer to Question I is in the affirmative, what is the effect of the 
reservation as between the reserving State and:  
(a) The parties which object to the reservation?  
(b) Those which accept it?  
III- What would be the legal effect as regards the answer to Question I if an 
objection to a reservation is made:  
(a) By a signatory which has not yet ratified?  
(b) By a State entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet done so?
17
 
 
The main question arising from the Advisory Opinion concerns the issue of 
“object and purpose.”18 As stated, a reservation is permissible “if (it) is compatible 
with the object and purpose of the Convention.”19 In light of the above case, Cassese’s 
argues that: the universality of a treaty and the number of states ratifying it supersede 
the integrity of the convention. Defining the “object and purpose” is left to other 
member States. Thus, the answer to the second question: if a party considers a 
reservation to be against the “object and purpose”, then “it can in fact consider that 
the reserving state is not a party to the convention.”20 This affirmation implies that 
treaty relationships will be fragmented and that the application of any treaty will be 
based on two questions: 
1) Whether the State party has made a reservation to the treaty. 
2) Whether other parties have considered the reservation to be compatible with 
the “object and purpose” of the treaty. 
                                               
16 Reservations to the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion, 1951 (May 28), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/10855.pdf (last visited 
May 15, 2007). 
17 Id. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
 8 
Depending on the above answers, provisions will be applicable in certain cases, 
not in others. Reserving states will only be considered parties to the treaty by states 
that accepted their reservations, which means objections to reservations can serve 
political motives.
21
 
 
B. Reservations to Human Rights Treaties 
Reservations to human rights treaties have been treated differently in several cases 
presented to international courts. The rising trend consists in regarding 
“impermissible reservations as severing that reservation so that the provision in 
question applies in full to the reserving state.”22 In other words, the reservation is not 
taken into consideration and the state party is bound by the obligations stipulated in 
the “reserved” provision. This trend seems to protect the integrity of human rights 
treaties, which is a fundamental issue since these treaties protect and promote basic 
inalienable rights. Cassese argues that “under this view, standards on human rights 
must prevail over concerns of sovereign states. If there is conflict between the two . . . 
, the former must prevail.”23 In the cases presented below, it is worth noting that 
courts are in charge of defining the “object and purpose” of the convention and 
holding reservations admissible or not.  
 
1. The European Court of Human Rights 
Several cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights are considered by 
scholars to be precedents in demonstrating the unique nature of human rights 
                                               
21 Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination 
Against Women, 85 The Am. J. of Int’l L. 301, 281-321 (1991). 
22 SHAW, supra note 4, at 829. 
23 CASSESE, supra note 15, at 13. 
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treaties.
24
 Thus, it is important to take the rulings of this Court into consideration 
when tackling the issue of reservations to human rights conventions. 
Case of Belilos v. Switzerland 
1) Facts and Procedure 
Belilos is considered to be a precedent in the issue of reservations to human rights 
treaties. Concerning the facts, Mrs Marlene Belilos, a Swiss student was arrested on 
16 April 1981 for having participated in an unauthorized demonstration (a 
demonstration for which no permission was issued). Mrs Belilos denied participating 
in the demonstration. And as an appeal to the decision held against her by the Police 
Board, “Mrs. Belilos applied to the Criminal Cassation Division of the Vaud Cantonal 
Court to have that decision declared null and void. She claimed principally that in 
view of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, the Police Board had no 
power to make a determination of the disputed offence; and in any event, she asked 
the court to hear her former husband and to redetermine the facts fully.”25 
Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates that: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Judgement shall be pronounced publicly by the press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or 
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or 
the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly 
necessary in the opinion of the court in special.
26
 
 
Nonetheless, Switzerland had issued an interpretative declaration concerning the 
above article when ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights, it claimed 
that: 
                                               
24 See CASSESE, supra note 15, at 130. 
25 Belilos v. Switzerland, App. No. 10328/83 Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1988). 
26 European Convention on Human Rights art.6, Nov. 4, 1950.Europ.T.S.No. 005. 
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“The Swiss Federal Council considers that the guarantee of fair trial in Art. 6, 
paragraph 1 (art. 6-1), of the Convention, in the determination of . . . any 
criminal charge against the person in question is intended solely to ensure 
ultimate control by the judiciary over the acts or decisions of the public 
authorities relating to . . . the determination of such a charge.”27 
 
Mrs Belilos, after exhausting all naional means, applied to the European Court of 
Human Rights on 24 March 1983.  
2) Reasoning and Decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
Article 64 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates that: 
Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its 
instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular 
provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its 
territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general 
character shall not be permitted under this article.
28
 
 
In the judgement, the Court went to define what is meant by “reservations of a 
general character” in the Convention, it held that these ones were reservations stated 
“in terms that are too vague or broad for it to be possible to determine their exact 
meaning and scope.”29 In other words, reservation should be specific, clear and 
focused on a particular issue. Moreover Article 64 (2) requires the reserving state to 
submit “a brief statement of the law concerned,”30 which Switzerland has failed to do. 
Taking into consideration that Switzerland’s reservation did not comply with the two 
requirements of Article 64 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court 
held that Switzerland’s reservation was invalid, and that the breach entitled the 
applicant to compensation. 
The above case highlights several important issues in the reservation regime 
and its implication on human rights treaties. First of all, it considers an interpretative 
                                               
27 Belilos v. Switzerland, App. No. 10328/83 Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1988). 
28 European Convention on Human Rights art.64, Nov. 4, 1950.Europ.T.S. No. 005. 
29 Belilos v. Switzerland, App. No. 10328/83 Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1988). 
30 European Convention on Human Rights art.64, Nov. 4, 1950.Europ.T.S.No. 005. 
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declaration to have the legal value of a reservation. Secondly, the Court went to reject 
a declaration made by a State, and held the latter bound by the “reserved” provision. 
Thus, it protected the integrity of the European Convention of Human Rights and 
posed a limitation to Switzerland’s Consent. Thirdly, The Court was responsible in 
this case for interpreting Article 64 of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
and emphasized a principle already found in the Vienna Convention and in the ICJ’s 
advisory opinion on The Reservations to the Genocide Convention: reservations must 
not be of a general nature, they should not contradict the “object and purpose” of the 
treaty. 
Belilos has been used as a precedent in numerous cases concerned with 
reservations to human rights conventions. Among these cases is the one presented 
below: the case of Weber v. Switzerland. Although the same country is in question, 
different legal arguments are presented: the Court avoids to touch upon the substance 
of the reservation and will focus on procedural elements. The coming case highlights 
how defining “the object and purpose” of a treaty can be complex and sensitive. 
Case of Weber v. Switzerland
31
 
a) Facts and Procedure 
A Swiss journalist, Franz Weber who is resides in Clarens; in the Canton de Vaud 
filed a complaint against R.M on 2 April 1980 claiming defamation. R.M. had 
accused Mr Weber of tax evasion in a newspaper. The investigating judge “ordered 
disclosure of the Helvetia Nostra association and the Franz Weber foundation’s 
articles and their accounts for the previous two years.”32 Although R.M was charged 
with defamation and his appeal was dismissed, Weber files a complaint “alleging 
misuse of official authority and coercion, but the investigating judge of the Canton de 
                                               
31 Weber v. Switzerland, App. No. 11034/84 Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1990). 
32 Id. 
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Vaud refused to take action”; the applicant challenged the Court en bloc. On 2 March 
1982, Franz Weber publicly announced in a press conference his challenge and claim 
against the investigating judge. The next day, the President of the Criminal Cassation 
Division of the Vaud Cantonal Court, under Article 185 (3) of the Vaud Code of 
Criminal Procedure accused the Applicant of breach of confidentiality and ordered a 
fine of 300 Swiss Francs together with a probationary period of a year. Weber appeal 
to this decision was dismissed by the Criminal Cassation Division. And on 16 
November 1983, his appeal to the Federal Court, based on Article 10 (on freedom of 
expression) and Article 6 (on the right to a fair and public trial) was also refused.  
b) Switzerland’s Reservation 
As highlighted earlier in Belilos,
33
 when ratifying the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Switzerland made a reservation to Article 6. The latter refers to the 
right to a “fair and public hearing.”34 
Switzerland’s reservation stipulates that: 
The rule contained in Article 6 (1), of the Convention that hearings shall be in 
public shall not apply to proceedings relating to the determination … of any 
criminal charge which, in accordance with cantonal legislation, are heard 
before an administrative authority. 
The rule that judgement must be pronounced publicly shall not affect the 
operation of cantonal legislation on civil or criminal procedure providing that 
judgement shall not be delivered in public but notified to the parties in 
writing.
35
 
 
Thus, the government argues that Article 6 of the Convention could not be applied to 
the case, and does not support the applicant’s claim.  
c) Court’s Reasoning and Decision 
                                               
33 Belilos v. Switzerland, App. No. 10328/83 Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1988). 
34 European Convention on Human Rights art.6, Nov. 4, 1950.Europ.T.S. No. 005. 
35 Weber v. Switzerland, App. No. 11034/84 Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1990). 
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In its judgement, the Court questioned the reservation to Article 6(1) on three 
different grounds: the applicability of Article 6(1) to the case, the validity of 
Switzerland’s reservation and the country’s compliance with this provision.  
Concerning the first point, the Court held that Article 6(1) is applicable since the 
national laws define the offence as being both disciplinary and criminal (if the latter 
was solely disciplinary, the provision would not have been applicable). Moreover, it 
interpreted the “confidentiality clause” as being applicable primarily to “those closely 
associated with the functioning of the courts,”36 such as lawyers, judges etc…And 
finally that the nature and “the degree of severity of the penalty”37 amounted to 
considering the case as a criminal one. 
Questioning the validity of Switzerland’s reservation, the Court refers to Article 64 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, as it previously did in the Belilos:
38
 
1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its 
instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular 
provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its 
territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general 
character shall not be permitted under this article.  
2. Any reservation made under this article shall contain a brief statement of the 
law concerned.
39
 
 
The Court argues that since Switzerland did not present “a brief statement of 
the law concerned”, the reservation to Article 6(1) is considered invalid. And 
therefore, the applicant’s claim is valid. The European Court of Human Rights also 
held that there has been a breach of Article 10 on freedom of expression and demands 
the State to compensate the applicant. Throughout the case, reference is made to the 
Belilos case, as a precedent in which Switzerland’s reservation was considered 
invalid. Moreover it is interesting to highlight how, in this case, “the object and 
                                               
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Belilos v. Switzerland, App. No. 10328/83 Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1988). 
39 European Convention on Human Rights art.64, Nov. 4, 1950. Europ.T.S. No. 005. 
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purpose” of the Convention were not mentioned. The Court based its judgement on 
procedural arguments and legal technicalities. For example, it referred to the 
procedures Switzerland should have complied with when making the reservation, and 
not on the substantive aspect of the reservation. This reasoning highlights the 
complexity of “the object and purpose” criteria, and how Courts prefer to avoid it, 
when the possibility is at hand. 
On a more general note, Switzerland found itself bound by a provision it had 
reserved, and going back to Cassese’s point, human rights treaties have introduced 
another limitation to State consent, a new trend in the international legal order. 
The European Court of Human Rights was not the only international body to support 
this trend; the General Comment from the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
highlights the same issue and redefines key concepts pertaining to the reservation 
regime. 
 
2.The Human Rights Committee 
The General Comment No. 24 of 1994
40
 
The General Comment No. 24 issued  in November 1994 concerns the reservations 
made by the 127 State parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. The reservations amount to 150 in number, and undermine the integrity of the 
Treaty. The Committee has therefore addressed certain questions in this General 
Comment touching upon fundamental concepts, and reemphasizing the unique aspect 
of human rights instruments. 
First, the Committee starts with precising the difference between a reservation 
and an interpretative declaration. This question, as illustrated in the Belilos case is 
                                               
40 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24/52 on Issues Relating to Reservations to the 
I.C.C.P.R, CCPR/C/21/REV.1/Add.6 (2 Nov.1994) available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/69c55b086f72957ec12563ed004ecf7a?Opendocument 
 15 
important because it highlights the binding nature of reservations, and the importance 
of undertanding the implication of a statement, independently from its title. The 
General Comment offers a clear definition, stating that “if a statement, irrespective of 
its name or title, purports to exclude, modify the legal effects of a treaty in its 
application to the State, it constitutes a reservation.”41 
Secondly, the Committee goes on reemphasizing principles already present in 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and in the ICJ’s Advisory 
Opinion on the Reservations to the Genocide Convention, such as the impossibility of 
States to make reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of a convention, 
and its obligation to respect jus cogens (peremptory norms) and customary 
international law.
42
  
Thirdly, the Committee focuses on the Optional Protocols of the Covenant. 
The First Optional Protocol concerns “the competence of the Committee to receive 
and consider communications from individuals who claim to be victims of a violation 
by a State party of any of the rights in the Covenant.”43 A reservation to the latter 
would be considered as incompatible with the “object and purpose” of the Covenant, 
since it implies a state’s lack of good faith. 
Fourthly and most importantly, the General Comment presents a key question 
concerning human rights treaties: which body is entitled to define the “object and 
purpose” of a Convention?44 After presenting the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the 
Reservations to the Genocide Convention, the Committee emphasized that State 
parties are, legally speaking, are entitled to the above task. Nonetheless, “the 
Committee believes that its provisions (those of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
                                               
41 Id. at. ¶ 3. 
42 See, Id. at. ¶ 8. 
43 Id. at. ¶ 13. 
44 See, Id. at. ¶ 16 
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treaties) on the role of State objections in relation to reservations are inappropriate to 
address the problem of reservations to human rights treaties.”45 In other words, state 
reciprocity is no longer sufficient in establishing State obligations and another body 
should be responsible for defining the “object and purpose” of treaties, and thus of 
accepting or refusing reservations. The Committee states that it “is particularly well 
placed to perform this task”46 and that State parties should use reservations as a 
temporary mean to reform domestic laws, while reporting to the responsible body.
47
 
The above General Comment underlines several questions concerning 
reservations to human rights instruments. Nonetheless, on a practical level, the 
Committee’s comments are not binding and its decisions about the permissibility of 
reservations would not be either. It is therefore important to keep in mind that 
although a new trend is emerging in the human rights sphere, the international 
community is based on a system of state consent and sovereignty, which seems to 
prevent human rights treaties from operating fully.  
The trade-off that seems to exist between the integrity and the universality of 
human rights treaties is a challenge that Ryan Goodman attempts to overcome. He 
argues “that reservations to human rights treaties should be presumed to be severable 
unless for a specific treaty there is evidence of a ratifying state’s intent to the 
contrary.”48 He supports this argument claiming that “third party institutions”49 should 
be responsible for determining the validity of reservations, not third state parties 
“because state O’s objections apply only to the relationship between itself and state R. 
Accordingly, state O can not prevent the incompatible reservations from affecting the 
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 Id. at. ¶ 17. 
46 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24/52, supra note 40, at ¶ 16. 
47 Id. 
48 Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 
531, 531-559 (2002). 
49 Id. at 532. 
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constitutive elements of the treaty.”50 In addition, the validity of a reservation would 
depend on “the state’s consent to be bound”51 by the treaty. In other words, Goodman 
states that “[a] reservation is not essential if the state would have ratified the treaty 
without it. An inessential reservation would be nullified, and the state would remain 
bound to the treaty without the benefit to the reservation.”52 The author offers a new 
understanding of state consent, which can generate answers to the reservation regime. 
His ideas will be referred to in the case studies of Chapter IV as well.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the coming chapter will focus on the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, as an international 
human rights law treaty, it is faced with the challenges presented above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
50 Id. at 535. 
51 Id. at 532. 
52 Id. at 532. 
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III. Reservations to CEDAW and their Implications 
As presented in Chapter 1, reservations to human rights conventions challenge their 
integrity and their efficiency in protecting the stipulated rights. The coming chapter 
will add focus to the above analysis by narrowing down the study to the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations Against Women and in 
questioning the validity of specific reservations: those invoking Islamic law. 
 
A. CEDAW 1981 
The Preamble of the United Nations Charter stipulates that one of the organization’s 
main objectives is “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large 
and small”53. In 1946, the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women was 
set up to protect women’s rights and promote “equal rights of men and women” as 
stipulated in the UN Charter.  After thirty years,  the General Assembly adopted on 18 
December 1979, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, which entered into force on 3 September 1981
54
 and is considered to 
be “the culmination of more than thirty years of work by the United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women”55. The Convention is also known as the 
international bill of rights for women. At its entry into force, the treaty was ratified by 
20 member states, while today 185 states are bound by it.
56
 
                                               
53 U.N. Charter Preamble.  
54 United Nations Convention on the Eliminations of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Sept. 1981, U.N.T.S. 20378. 
55 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report on the Progress Achieved 
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Women, U.N. Doc A/CONF/.177/7, available at 
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The Convention is composed of a preamble and 30 articles. The preamble 
emphasizes the general principles of the United Nations, mentioning the importance 
of “international peace and security,”57 as well as referring to major human rights 
documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenants on Human Rights as well as resolutions by the agencies of the UN.
58
 The 
preamble also highlights the importance of enhancing and protecting women’s rights 
as part of the larger project of development.
59
 Article 1 defines discrimination against 
women as: 
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the bass of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality 
of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
60
 
 
The following articles in the convention add clarification to this definition by 
stipulating specific rights. Articles are grouped in six main parts. The first part 
focuses on policy measures, while the second and the third highlight civil rights, such 
as the right “to vote in all elections . . . to participate in the formulation of government 
. . . [and] to participate in non-governmental organizations and associations.”61 Part 
IV focuses on marriage and family life, while the last two parts concern procedural 
matters. Throughout the convention, three main core issues can be discerned:
62
 
a) Civil rights and the legal status of women: The legal status of women is the 
main focus of the Convention. For example, the right of women to participate in the 
political sphere is highlighted throughout the first 14 articles: Article 7 is concerned 
with her right to vote, Article 8 stresses “her equal right to represent her country at an 
                                               
57 United Nations Convention on the Eliminations of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
preamble, Sept. 1981, U.N.T.S. 20378. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at. art. 1.  
61 Id. at. art.  7. 
62 CEDAW Prog. Rep., supra note 55. 
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international level.” 63 Nationality rights are also protected under Article 9, and equal 
rights in employment education and socio-economic activities are among the 
protected civil rights. Concerning the private sphere, Article 16 the Convention 
focuses on women’s rights in marriage and in the family sphere.  
Civil rights are relatively tangible, and violations of these rights are found directly in 
domestic laws, which might prevent women from being equally treated in both the 
private and public spheres. In practice, violations of these rights can be pinpointed, 
and thus the Convention can have a proactive role in focusing upon them. 
b) A second emphasis is put on reproductive rights. For example Article 5 
encourages “a proper understanding of maternity as a social function” and Article 6 
aims at eliminating women trafficking and exploitation.
64
 The Convention does not 
merely state “negative rights”, it encourages States to actively provide for women and 
“positively” act in protection of their rights.  
c) As stated at the CEDAW 29
th
 session “the third general thrust of the 
Convention aims at enlarging our understanding of the concept of human rights, as it 
gives formal recognition to the influence of culture and tradition on restricting 
women’s enjoyment of their fundamental rights”65. In other words, the Convention’s 
articulation of rights reflects the underlying understanding that culture can in certain 
cases define, restrict or violate women’s rights. The effect of tradition and cultural 
practices on the rights of women is a recurrent and fundamental issue that is present 
throughout the Convention, but is also at the core of numerous questions since it is 
one major cause that led to the reservations imposed on CEDAW. 
 
                                               
63 Id. 
64 United Nations Convention on the Eliminations of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
art.6, Sept. 1981, U.N.T.S. 20378. 
65 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report of the Twenty Eighth and 
Twenty Ninth Session, U.N. Doc A/58/38 (July 2003). 
 21 
B. Reservations to CEDAW 1981 and their Permissibility 
1. Article 28 of CEDAW 
The permissibility of doing reservations to CEDAW is covered by Article 28(2), 
which implicitly refers back to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
and stipulates that: “A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
present convention shall not be permitted.”66 
The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, created in 1982, supervises the implementation of the Convention.
67
 
Although the Convention does not specifically state articles to which reservations are 
impermissible, the Committee considers that Articles 2 and 16 to be central to the 
“object and purpose” of the Convention.68 
On one hand, Article 2, is important to be fully analyzed, stipulates that: 
 
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to 
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake:  
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their 
national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated 
therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical 
realization of this principle;  
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions 
where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;  
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with 
men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public 
institutions the effective protection of women against any act of 
discrimination;  
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against 
women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in 
conformity with this obligation;  
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women by any person, organization or enterprise;  
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women;  
                                               
66 United Nations Convention on the Eliminations of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 
28 Sept. 1981, U.N.T.S. 20378. 
67 CEDAW Prog. Rep., supra note 55. 
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(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination 
against women.
69
 
 
In brief, Article 2 is a comprehensive Article which states the general obligation of 
State parties to “condemn discrimination against women”. It also demands member 
States to actively change domestic laws and practices, which might violate women’s 
rights. It is quite obvious that a reservation to this Article is considered by the 
Committee as impermissible since Article 2 is a brief summary of the whole 
Convention and stipulates the core issues and responsibilities of its parties. 
Nonetheless, the Article covering so much and demanding States to take long term 
measures (such as changing constitutional provisions), is prone to reservations: the 
general terms included seem to expand States obligations. States not only will need 
time, but also resources to ensure these reforms.  
On the other hand, Article 16 concerned with equality of men and women in 
marital rights and family relations is considered to be another core Article by the 
Committee. It states that: 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in 
particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:  
(a) The same right to enter into marriage;  
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only 
with their free and full consent;  
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution;  
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital 
status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the 
children shall be paramount;  
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and 
spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and 
means to enable them to exercise these rights;  
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, 
trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these 
concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the children 
shall be paramount;  
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(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to 
choose a family name, a profession and an occupation;  
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, 
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether 
free of charge or for a valuable consideration.  
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all 
necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum 
age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official 
registry compulsory.
70
 
 
Women’s rights in the private sphere are mainly covered by the Article above. That is 
the reason why the Committee considers it to be a core Article and argues that 
reservation to it should not be permissible
71
. 
Nonetheless, reservations to these two articles have been made and few countries 
have withdrawn them. The question relating to the objectivity of the “the object and 
purpose” test remains an open question. 
 
2. Reservations Invoking Islamic Law  
The core issue in this paper is on reservations invoking Islamic law. It is therefore 
important to keep in mind that the study offered below is not a comprehensive 
analysis of all the reservations made to CEDAW 1981, but it will uniquely focus on 
those justified by Shari’a.  
Article 2 
As mentioned previously, States make reservations to Article 2 invoking its 
incompatibility with Islamic law. This Article defines the main responsibilities of 
State parties and the duties they should fulfil for the protection and promotion of 
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women’s rights. The reservations invoking Islamic Law were made by Bangladesh, 
Syria, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Singapore.  
On one hand, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria have not given any 
specific detail about the laws contravening the provision, nor about the eventual steps 
taken towards the promotion of women rights. The reservations are generally short 
and broad. For example, Bahrain stated that: 
“The Kingdom of Bahrain makes reservations with respect to the following 
provision(s) of the Convention: - Article 2, in order to ensure its implementation 
within the bounds of the provisions of the Islamic Shariah.”72 
Egypt stipulated: “A General reservation on article 2: The Arab Republic of Egypt is 
willing to comply with the content of this article, provided that such compliance does 
not run counter to the Islamic Sharia.”73 
“And Libya as well very shortly articulated that: “Article 2 of the Convention 
shall be implemented with due regard for the peremptory norms of the Islamic 
Shariah relating to determination of the inheritance portions of the estate of a 
deceased person, whether female or male.”74 
Finally, Syria enumerated all its reservation in one paragraph very briefly stating also 
invoking Islamic Shari’a.75 
On the other hand, Morocco and Singapore elaborated about its reservation to 
Article 2, giving detail about their national systems and Morocco seems to offer more 
explanation about Islamic law and its relation with women’s rights, it states that:  
With regard to article 2: The Government of the Kingdom of Morocco express 
its readiness to apply the provisions of this article provided that:  
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- They are without prejudice to the constitutional requirement that regulate the 
rules of succession to the throne of the Kingdom of Morocco;  
- They do not conflict with the provisions of the Islamic Shariah. It should be 
noted that certain of the provisions contained in the Moroccan Code of 
Personal Status according women rights that differ from the rights conferred 
on men may not be infringed upon or abrogated because they derive primarily 
from the Islamic Shariah, which strives, among its other objectives, to strike a 
balance between the spouses in order to preserve the coherence of family 
life.
76
  
 
Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia have also made reservations to Article 
2, but in their case, claiming incompatibility with national legislation.
77
 
Article 16  
Article 16 concerns women’s rights in the private sphere. It touches upon issues such 
as equal rights between men and women in marriage, divorce and property. The 
countries that made reservations to this Article are: Bangladesh Article 16(1), 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait Article 16(f), Libya Article 16 (c) and (d), Morocco, 
Syrian Article 16 (2) and Singapore.
78
 
Bahrain, Kuwait and Syria are very brief and general in their reservations. For 
example, Kuwait states that: “The Government of the State of Kuwait declares that it 
does not consider itself bound by the provision contained in article 16 (f) inasmuch as 
it conflicts with the provisions of the Islamic Shariah , Islam being the official 
religion of the State.”79 
Other countries offer more explanation, such as Morocco touch upon the 
meaning of equality in Islamic law, “which guarantees to each of the spouses rights 
and responsibilities within a framework of equilibrium and complementary in order to 
preserve the sacred bond of matrimony.”80 Egypt as well elaborates on the issue of 
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divorce, and Singapore mentions its “multi-racial and multi-religious society and the 
need to respect the freedom of minorities to practise their religious and personal 
laws”81 as supporting the implementation of Shari’a. 
Also in the case of Article 16, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia have claimed 
incompatibility with domestic laws, but did not mention Shari’a. 
General reservation:  
While some States, as noted above, presented specific reservations invoking 
Shari’a, others made general reservations. For instance, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
made a general reservation, stating that: 
“In case of contradiction between any term of the Convention and the norms of 
Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe the contradictory terms 
of the Convention.”82 
Clearly, the scope of the reservation in this case is much broader. It covers the 
Convention as a whole. To what extent can Saudi Arabia be considered as a member 
Party remains a question.
83
 
The above presentation shows that countries abiding by Islamic law in their 
national legislations have not, in all cases, done the same reservations. For example, 
Iraq and Kuwait did not make a reservation to Article 2. Nonetheless, it is valid to 
argue that the same Articles (2 and 16) pose the main controversies because the 
Committee considers them to be core provisions, and imposing reservations on them 
amounts to an incompatibility with the “object and purpose” of the Convention.84 
Moreover, the scope of the reservations vary to a great degree, certain countries make 
elaborate reservations, with specific detail, while others are broader and more general.  
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Finally, it is worth noting that Indonesia, which follows Islamic law, has not made 
any substantive reservation to CEDAW 1981, the only reservation it made concerned 
procedural matters.
85
 
 
3. Reactions to the Reservations  
The reservations invoking Shari’a have generated numerous objections. They 
generally touch upon the lack of explanation given by reserving countries, and, in 
some cases, mention the absence of good faith. Objections vary in length, detail and 
not all objecting countries mention reservations invoking Islamic. Examples are 
illustrated below: 
Australia objected Bahrain’s reservations states that: 
The Government of Austria further considers that, in the absence of further 
clarification, the reservation to articles 2 and 16 which does not clearly specify 
the extent of Bahrain's derogation from the provisions in question raises 
doubts as to the degree of commitment assumed by Bahrain in becoming a 
party to the Convention since it refers to the contents of Islamic Sharia.
86
  
 
Canada, although objecting to reservations by the Maldives, does not mention 
reservations invoking Shari’a.87 Denmark, objected Saudi Arabia’s general 
reservation, as well as the reservations made by Bahrain and Syria.
88
 It is noteworthy 
that it did not mention other countries that have made the exact same reservations, 
such as Egypt and Morocco.
89
 The same is applicable to Estonia’s objection to the 
reservation made by Syria, but does not mention other countries. 
It is interesting to see how countries are selective in their objections. The 
“object and purpose” test does not seem to apply uniformly to all countries, whether 
political interests are taken into consideration remains a question. 
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Brandt and Kaplan state that scholars have previously argued that international courts 
and mechanisms can offer an answer to the debate concerning Islamic law and 
reservations to CEDAW.
90
 Nonetheless, the authors believe that based on practical 
experience, “seeking judicial fora to solve . . . the tension between women’s and 
religious rights is unlikely to produce results.”91 The alternative proposed is to render 
reservations more specific and focused. The authors use Egypt and Bangladesh’s 
broad reservations as examples to prove the main challenge to overcome. In the same 
article, Brandt and Kaplan mention that States should in “good faith”, “submit a 
detailed explanation of how Shari’a conceivably conflicts with CEDAW 
provisions.”92 They believe that such an explanation would be considered as a step 
forward and would “resolve tensions between religious rights and women’s rights.”93  
Lijnzaad adds that “the reservations invoking shari’a law appear to be 
detrimental to the Convention’s goal of eliminating discrimination.”94 She argues that 
there are two methods to analyze the issue: one could use “the approach based on the 
law of treaties, which has the advantage of avoiding the delicate subject of cultural 
relativity,”95 or “the approach based on human rights law, which may raise questions 
of conflict of rights.”96 In other words, according to Lijnzaad, treaty law offers a 
stronger and more tangible framework to the debate than the human rights law 
framework. Completely enclosing the issue in its legal aspect can prevent unending 
debate over cultural relative issues. 
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Although Lijnzaad’s argument is valid at a theoretical level, practically speaking, 
treaty law -highlighting the issue of object and purpose- has not prevented the debate 
from arising and has not offered answers either. Brandt and Kaplan’s idea of requiring 
States to provide further explanation about how Islamic law is incompatible with 
CEDAW seems to be more efficient on a practical base.
97
 
Concerning the issue of “object and purpose”, Belinda Clark argues that: 
 [A]lthough the standard is intended to be an objective one, it is subjectively 
applied, i.e., compatibility is assessed by the sole judgement of every other 
party. Looking at those which are (or are not) the objecting states in respect of 
a particular reservation demonstrates that political or extralegal considerations 
come into play when states evaluate the compatibility of reservations.
98
 
 
In other words, the “object and purpose” test is, in some cases, used as a political 
instrument and not as a legal one. 
To sum up, the lack of uniformity between the reaction of countries following 
Shari’a and making reservations to CEDAW 1981 presents one main question: What 
is Islamic law? How is it applied? And to what extent is it compatible with women’s 
rights, as articulated in CEDAW? These questions will be tackled in the coming 
chapter. 
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IV. Islamic Law and Women’s Rights 
This chapter is primarily concerned with defining Islamic law, presenting its sources 
and highlighting its stance concerning women’s rights. The presentation hereafter is in 
no way exhaustive or comprehensive, but these few pages will attempt to emphasize 
one main characteristic of Islamic law: its flexibility. It is through the possibility of 
interpreting and reinterpreting according to the social context it operates in, that one 
can reach a progressive articulation of women’s rights. The focus of this chapter will 
be made on women’s status in personal law, since it is within this field that the 
majority of the reservations to CEDAW have been made by countries following 
Shari’a. 
 
A. Shari’a and Fiqh: A Crucial Distinction 
Before analyzing the sources of Islamic law, it is important to present a major 
distinction between Shari’a and Fiqh so as to avoid confusion in presenting the 
sources hereunder. Shari’a “literally means the pathway, or the path to be followed 
(…). In [a] technical sense Shari’a refers to the canon law of Islam and includes the 
totality of Allah’s commandments.”99The commandments are broad and general 
principles to be followed. Fiqh is “the process of deducing and applying Shari’a 
principles and injunctions in real or hypothetical cases or situations.”100 In applying 
the broad principles to specific situations, one reaches the practical application of 
Shari’a. Thus, it is possible to deduce from these general norms specific laws 
pertaining to different fields of law (as known is the modern legal systems), such as 
personal status law, criminal law or public law. Fiqh is in and of itself a 
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methodology.
101
 As a matter of fact, in the analysis of Islamic law, Fiqh is at the core 
of the debate, not Shari’a. The interpretations and practical implementation of the 
broad norms found in the Quran and Sunna, which are the sayings and the deeds of 
the Prophet, can be diverse and sometimes controversial. In other words, depending 
on the context and on the tools of interpretation, the same verse from the Quran can 
be interpreted differently. Yet, it is in the diversity of opinions and flexibility that one 
can reach an area of compatibility between Islam and international standards of 
women’s rights. 
 
B. Sources of Islamic Law (Usul al Fiqh) 
The sources of Islamic law are important to analyze because they include tools and 
methods of reasoning and interpretation, which are essential in understanding the 
issue of women’s rights in Islam. Other than the Quran and the Sunna, the other 
sources depend on consensus, human reasoning, public interest and sometimes on 
custom. These elements are changing and evolving, thus they are the essence of 
flexibility in Shari’a. If used in a progressive way, one can ensure the protection of 
women’s rights. 
 
1. The Quran 
The sacred book of Islam is believed to be the revealed word of God to the Prophet. 
As noted by Abdel Haqq, “The Quran is not and does not profess itself to be a code of 
law or a law book. Instead, it serves as the cornerstone upon which Islamic law is 
based- the primary source for the principles of law- in addition to selected, specific 
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injunctions.”102 There is overall consensus about the supremacy of the Quran over the 
other sources among Islamic scholars and schools of thought. Abdulahi  An-Na’im 
argues that: 
The key to understanding the role of the Quran in the formulation of Shari’a is 
the appreciation that the Quran primarily sought to establish certain basic 
standards of behaviour for the Muslim community rather than to express those 
standards as rights and obligations.
103
   
 
In other words, the Quran highlights basic and general principles to be later 
articulated by interpretation into a code of rights and obligations. 
Jamal J. Nasir highlights, “the wording of a Quranic ruling is either conclusive and 
binding (qati’) . . . , or contingent (zanni).”104 The author adds that the verses can be 
literally or metaphorically interpreted.
105
 From that perspective, the differences found 
between the schools of thought can be partially explained by the broadness of Quranic 
verses, which, in some cases, leave room for interpretation. 
 
2. The Tradition or Sunna 
Sunna means “the exemplary mode of conduct”106 . It represents the second main 
source of Islamic law. It is divided into: the sayings of the Prophet (Hadith or Sunna 
qaulia), his acts (Sunna filia) and his tacit consent (sunna taqririyya).
107
 The 
Prophet’s sayings and deeds are divided into three groups, according to their degree of 
certitude, since the Sunna was transmitted orally: 
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“- Mutawatir: “i.e.: a tradition handed on through an uninterrupted chain of 
trustworthy witnesses. This is absolutely certain.”108 
- Mash-hoor: This term qualifies a tradition that misses “a link in the chain by which 
it is handed down.” Nonetheless, “Mash-hoor is a strong legislative source, carrying 
high probability if not certitude.”109 
- Khabar Al- Ahad: It is the Hadith or the saying of the Prophet, which was 
transmitted by one narrator uniquely. To be accepted, this type of Sunna has to fulfil 
certain criteria, depending on the schools of thought.”110 
 
3. Consensus or Ijma’ 
In cases where the Quran and the Sunna fail to answer legal questions, ijma’ or 
consensus is considered as another source of fiqh. “Learned scholars of Islam and/or 
community of Muslims of a particular era come to agreement on an issue, and 
individual reasoning via several methodologies.”111 
 
4. Analogy or Qiyas 
Another form of reasoning in absence of Quranic and Sunna guidance would be the 
methodology of analogy. Nonetheless, this source is subordinate to ijma’, in other 
words, if consensus has not been made about an issue, then qiyas would be accepted 
as a source of legislation.
112
 It consists in comparing a case that has a common feature 
with the case at hand,‘illa, and applying the judgement of the latter to the former. 
Only qualified scholars are entitled to exercise this form of individual reasoning.
113
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5. Other Sources 
- Istihsan (Public Interest) 
The idea of public interest has been referred to in different terms, according to 
the schools of thought. The Hanbali School names it Istislah, while the Maliki School 
uses the term Masaleh Mursala. Although slight differences exist in the specific 
definition of each term, scholars agree that: 
Istihsan is the process of selecting one acceptable alternative solution over 
another because the former appears more suitable for the situation at hand, 
even though the selected solution may be technically weaker than the rejected 
one.
114
  
 
Public interest is considered to be a source of legislation based on reasoning, but 
subordinate to the sources mentioned above. 
- Istihab (Presumption of Continuity) 
Istishab “stands for the proposition that a situation or thing known to exist 
continues to exist until the contrary is proven.”115 Presumption of innocence in 
Islamic law stems from this form of reasoning. 
- ‘Urf (Custom) 
The schools of thought give custom, as source of law, different importance. As 
An-Na’im argues the Maliki and Hanafi schools recognize it, while the Shaf’i school 
completely rejects the use of custom as a source of law
116. Nonetheless, “prevailing 
customs may be given recognition only where they do not contravene Islamic 
principles.”117 
To summarize the above paragraph, Fiqh is based on numerous sources. Other 
than the Quran and Sunna, they have the common feature of engaging human 
reasoning and interpretation in the articulation of Islamic legislation. Fiqh is based on 
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human reasoning, and, although it is derived from a number of general principles, 
believed to be divine, the application of these ones is changeable and flexible. In order 
to highlight the implications of human reasoning in Islamic law, the coming part will 
emphasize the methodologies used and/or proposed by Islamic scholars in the 
interpretation of Islamic law. 
 
C. The Sunni Classical Schools of Thought 
For the purpose of this thesis, the Schools of thought, which will be relevant in the 
later chapters, are the four major Sunni Schools of thought. Their creation is the result 
of “the dialectical interplay between the text and individual opinion.”118 Thus, their 
presentation is essential for a comprehensive understanding of the different 
methodologies used in Islamic jurisprudence. 
 
1. The Hanafi School 
Abu Hanifa al-Nu’man b. Thabit (699-767) was the founder of the Hanafi School. He 
used qiyas as a tool of “legal deduction”119 and “[his] methodology was reflected not 
only in his answering of actual cases but also in his inventing of hypothetical sample 
cases which he examined within the texts, deducing and applying the relevant 
reasoning that he found there.”120 In other words, his methodology highly depended 
on analogy and deduction.  
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Concerning the geographical influence of this school, Schacht affirms that the Hanafi 
School spread from Iraq and Syria to the Ottoman Empire, leaving its traces today in 
countries, like Egypt.
121
 
 
2. The Shafei School 
Abdulah bin Shafei, known as Shafei “[] was able to produce a clear and independent 
Islamic methodology in understanding the law.”122 Schacht argues that Shafei 
considered the Quran and the Sunna as “the two principles”123 and gave consensus 
and analogy a subordinate place.
124
 He also recognizes istislah or public interest as 
ibn Hanbal.
125
 
 
3. The Maliki School 
Malik b. Anas’s methodology puts an emphasis “on the norms and practices of Umar 
and the people of Medina [,which] made his school a fundamental textual base of the 
Islamic legal fabric.”126 In other words, he recognizes, in addition to the principles 
sources of Islamic law, the role of custom and traditions. 
 
4. The Hanbali School 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal is the founder of the Hanbali School. As Melchert argues, “the 
greatest extant collection of Ahmad’s learning is his massive Musnad.”127 The 
Musnad, is a collection of Hadiths or sayings of the Prophet, and is reflective of ibn 
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Hanbal’s methodology, “[who] would refer to a weak hadith in preference to 
analogy.”128 He accepted the principles of masaleh mursala as well as istihsan.129  
The Hanbali School is followed nowadays in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait as well as in Gulf 
States.
130
 
To sum up, the Classical Schools interpreted the verses of the Quran and the 
sayings in the Sunna according to the tools of reasoning recognized as being sources 
of Islamic law, such as analogy or interest. In addition to this methodology, modern 
methods of interpretation are being discussed among scholars; these ones will be 
presented in the coming section. 
 
D. Methods of Interpretation 
1. Ijtihad 
The sources presented above, other than the Quran and Sunna, all use ijtihad to reach 
a legal outcome. “Ijtihad literally means hard striving or strenuousness, but 
technically it means exercising independent juristic reasoning to provide answers 
when the Quran and Sunna are silent.”131 An-Na’im states that during the eighth and 
ninth centuries A.D. ijtihad had a major role in the construction of Islamic law. Since 
the tenth century A.D. “the doors” of ijtihad closed and as Joseph Schacht argues: 
This freedom to exercise one’s own judgement independently was 
progressively restricted by several factors, such as the achievement of local, 
then general consensus, the formation of groups or circles within the ancient 
schools of law, the subjection of unfettered opinion to the increasingly strict 
discipline of systematic reasoning, and last but not least the appearance of 
numerous traditions from the Prophet.
132
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The qualification of those practicing ijtihad has also been a controversial 
question during the tenth century leading to the end of this methodology. An-Na’im 
not only calls for a reopening of “the doors” of ijtihad but he also emphasizes the 
importance or redefining it and rearticulating its limitations
133
. For examples, one of 
the limitations he presents is that “under the historical formulation of usul al-fiqh . . ., 
ijtihad is not possible even in matter settled through ijma’.”134 He supports his claim 
by referring to Umar (the second guided caliph and leading Companion of the 
Prophet), who used ijtihad even in matters where the Quran and Sunna were precise 
and clear.
135
 In other words, An-Na’im challenges the hierarchy of sources established 
throughout the history of Islamic jurisprudence and calls for their reanalysis. He states 
that:  
[C]ontemporary Muslims have the competence to reformulate usul al fiqh and 
exercise ijtihad even in matters governed by clear and definite texts of the 
Quran and Sunna as long as the outcome of such ijtihad is consistent with the 
essential message of Islam.
136
  
 
 
2. Taqlid 
Taqlid or “the following of authoritative opinions”137 has, according to Coulson, 
enabled scholars to select different opinions and views from the authoritative schools 
of Islamic thought to respond to the new demands of society.
138
 Schacht argues that: 
Whatever the theory might say on ijtihad and taklid, the activity of the [] 
scholars, after the ‘closing of the door of ijtihad’, was no less creative, within 
the limits set to it by the nature of Shari’a, than that of their predecessors. 
New sets of facts constantly arose in life, and they had to be mastered and 
moulded within the traditional tools provided by legal science.
139
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Schacht adds that this rigidity found in the methodology of taqlid helped 
“Islamic law to maintain its stability over centuries which saw the decay of the 
political institutions of Islam.”140 In other words, it maintained the Islamic legal 
framework integral and protected it from opinions that might have lacked credibility 
and would have led to a fragmentation within Islamic jurisprudence.  
But the rigidity highlighted by Schacht was also at the core of numerous critiques 
calling for a “reopening of the doors of ijtihad”. Selecting views from different 
schools of thought (selective methodology) seems weak in establishing argumentative 
consistency. From that standpoint, Hallaq synthesized these critiques and classified 
them into two groups: “religious utilitarianism” and “religious liberalism.”141  
 
3. The Utilitarian Approach 
As Hallaq presents it, Muhammad ‘Abduh, who is an “Egyptian scholar, journalist, 
theologian, jurist, grand mufti, and reformer, regarded as an architect of Islamic 
modernism
”
,
142
 introduced the idea of religious utilitarianism. Rashid Rida who was a 
“Syrian Islamic revivalist, reformer, and writer. [He] lived in Egypt from 1897 until 
his death. [And he was a] close associate and disciple of Muhammad Abduh
”143
, 
developed the idea of utalitarianism into a more comprehensive philosophy and legal 
framework.
144
 The underlying support of this approach is the idea of interest
145
. 
“Aside from matters of worship and religious ritual, which were to remain in the 
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purview of revelation, Rida upheld a legal theory strictly anchored in natural law, 
where considerations of human need, interest and necessity would reign supreme in 
elaborating a legal corpus.”146 To construct his theory, Rida establishes a number of 
premises, which enable him to be read in a moderate light: depending on the Quran 
and Sunna, he offers a new method of interpretation. In other words, he finds support 
to his idea in the classical scholarly discourses.
147
 Nonetheless, the ambivalence found 
in Rida’s methodology was controversial: He relied on the earlier authorities, to 
emphasize the ideas of need and interest, while “rejecting traditional legal theory,”148 
transforming a minor concept such as interest into the base of his methodology.
149
 
This ambivalence, as Hallaq argues, justifies “that these writings remained 
mere academic discussions, failing to affect the world in practice.”150 In continuation 
of Rida’s theory, ‘Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf confines in his own utilitarian approach 
“the scope of the Quran to a few, general, principles and rules [he] was clearly 
attempting to circumscribe its legislative function significantly.”151 
The main critique addressed to religious utilitarianism is its subjectivity and 
lack of consistency in its methodology. As Hallaq summarizes it, “To speak of these 
concepts [istislah and necessity] without a methodology that can control the premises, 
conclusions and the lines of reasoning these concepts require a highly relativistic 
venture.”152 Thus “religious liberalism”153 offers an alternative, which seems to be 
based on a consistent methodology. 
4. The Liberal Approach 
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Religious liberalism is a methodology that consists in understanding religious texts in 
their social contexts, “the connection between the revealed text and modern society 
does not turn upon a literalistic hermeneutic, but rather upon an interpretation of the 
spirit and broad intention behind the specific language of the texts.”154 Among the 
supporters of such a methodology is Muhammad Sa’id ‘Ashmawi, who is an 
“Egyptian judge, intellectual, lecturer, and former head of the State Security Tribunal. 
. . . [He] holds a secular orientation and advocates the separation of religion and 
politics [and] [a]rticulates critical views of political Islamist movements.”155 He also 
introduces a distinction between “religion as a pure idea and religious thought as an 
elaboration of that idea.”156 In other words, he separates divine and human laws, 
doing so in an elaboration of six premises. He argues that Shari’a is a “state of mind”, 
a genuine desire of the society to be governed by this law. In addition, he considers 
Shari’a to be “revealed for particular reasons that have to do with a particular human 
reality.”157 In ‘Ashmawi’s opinion, Islamic law should be interpreted in ways serving 
general interest. He also argues that “the Quranic discourse pertains in one way or 
another, to the Prophet”158: he emphasizes the difference between universal principles 
and principles related uniquely to the Prophet. Finally, in his opinion, he mentions the 
existing link between Shari’a and the pre-Islamic era, which complements his theory 
of contextualizing the law. In essence, ‘Ashmawi “reverts to the distinction between 
religion as a pure, divine idea and the religious system as a human creation based on 
that idea.”159 Although the practical application of such a methodology has been 
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highly contested, followers of ‘Ashmawi, such as Rahman and Shahrur employed the 
“textual/contextual analysis”160, which seem to offer a stronger theoretical base for 
reform compared to the utilitarian methodology, which does not follow a 
homogeneous framework. 
Analyzing these different methodologies of interpretation highlight the 
evolving and changing nature of Islamic law. It also emphasizes the ongoing debate 
about finding common grounds between the principles of Islam and the demands of a 
modern world. The overlapping of these two frameworks can offer a counter-
argument to the reservations invoking Shari’a to CEDAW. To analyze this question 
in depth, it is necessary to present women’s status and rights within Islamic law, and 
to show once again that the issue leaves spaces for interpretation, spaces that could 
promote women’s rights. 
 
E- Women’s Rights in Islamic Law 
The aim of this section is to illustrate women’s rights under Islamic personal status 
law. To maintain a focus, and relate the study to the CEDAW reservations, women’s 
rights in marriage, divorce and inheritance will be at the core of this section. It will be 
argued that although in certain areas practical inequalities (based on the social system) 
exist between men and women in the application of Islamic law, different 
interpretations can be used in the promotion of women’s rights. The major 
inequalities will be presented, then responded to in order to highlight the role of 
human reasoning and interpretation, but also to emphasize that “a ceiling exists” in 
the practical application of Islamic norms. In other words, due to embedded beliefs, 
even the most progressive interpretation can reach a limit in practice. The coming part 
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focuses on how Shari’a is applied de facto, compared to a de jure possibility of 
interpretation. Before analyzing the different areas of debate, it is important to keep 
into consideration that equality is a major principle in Islam and that, as Ann 
Elizabeth Mayer puts it: 
Not only did the Quran attack institutions of pre-Islamic Arabia that 
contributed to women’s degraded and vulnerable status, but Islam also 
conferred rights on women in the seventh century that women in the West 
were unable to obtain until quite recently. Muslim women, for example, 
enjoyed full legal personality, could own and manage property, and, according 
to some interpretations of the Quran, enjoyed the right to divorce on very 
liberal grounds.
161
 
 
The areas of debate in question, where Shari’a seems to discriminate on the basis of 
gender are the following: 
 
1. Marriage 
- Concluding the Marriage Contract: 
Although exceptions exist, the general rule in Islamic countries consists in 
denying women their right to contract their marriage. “A Muslim woman needs a wali 
(guardian) to contract the marriage on her behalf.”162 The justification behind this 
legal requirement is the protection of women “who may be victimized by designing 
men”163. As Al-Hibri argues, “this concern appears reasonable, but it makes sense 
legally only if we adopt a patriarchal view of women. A rational independent woman 
of sound judgement requires no protection (although she may seek advice).”164  
Within Islamic jurisprudence, one can find a support to the above argument, the 
Hanafi School of thought recognizes “the mature woman’s right to contract her own 
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marriage.”165 The base of that view is that Islamic law enables women to contract in 
financial issues.
166
 Thus, they have the right to contract their own marriages. 
This example demonstrates how within different schools of Islamic jurisprudence, one 
can attain a progressive understanding of women’s rights. 
- Obligation to Obey the Husband (ta’ah): 
The Quran stipulates that: “Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, 
because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they 
support them from their means.”167 This verse has been used and abused to support 
men’s superiority to women and to justify women’s submission to them. Nonetheless, 
as Aziza Al-Hibri notes: 
The Qur'an was describing (and not recommending) in this ayah a situation 
akin to the traditional one existing at the time, where some women were 
financially dependent. In those circumstances, the ayah informs us, God gave 
the man supporting the responsibility (taklif, not privilege) of offering the 
woman guidance and advice in those areas in which he happens to be more 
qualified or experienced. The woman, however, is entitled to reject both 
(otherwise the advisory role is no longer advisory).
168
 
 
Derived from the above verse, the idea of a wife’s obedience to her husband is 
stipulated in numerous legal codes in Islamic countries. Al-Hibri argues that the idea 
of ta’ah “enables the husband to prohibit the wife from leaving her home, unless she 
is willing to risk loss of financial support and, in some cases, divorce.”169 This 
concept is used as a justification to women’s rights abuses. The author adds that “this 
unbelievable oppression is an intolerable violation of Quranic and international 
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standards of human dignity.”170 In support of her argument, Al-Hibri refers to the 
Sunna of the Prophet stating that: 
[A]s a husband, the Prophet did not demand ‘obedience’ at home. Instead, his 
private life was characterized by cooperation and consultation, all to the 
amazement of some of the men who knew about it. This egalitarian model is 
not the basis of the Codes which have departed from this Sunnah.
171
 
 
In other words, the concept of ta’ah is related to the traditional patriarchal 
social systems that dominate most Islamic countries. In analyzing verses of the Quran 
and the Sunna of the Prophet, one can easily find support to a progressive articulation 
of women’s rights. 
 
2. Polygamy 
The Quran states: “marry of the women, who seem good to you, two or three or four; 
and if ye fear that ye cannot do justice (to so many) then one (only)”172 
The application of this verse has varied tremendously according to the time and 
location of the practice. In certain countries following Shari’a, polygamy is a 
protected right by the law, while in other countries, such as Tunisia, polygamy is 
prohibited. In the latter case, the reason behind the prohibition stems from a Quranic 
verse as well, which states that: “Ye are never able to be fair and just as between 
women, even if it is your ardent desire.”173 This verse seems to respond to the above 
verse (3) in men’s obligation to maintain equal treatment between their wives, or else 
to be under the obligation to completely refrain from taking a second wife. 
Among the countries applying Islamic law, different procedural obligations are 
imposed. In Iraq, for example, the permission of a judge has to be sought prior to 
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taking a second wife. In Jordan, the only restriction to polygamy would be for a 
woman to include a condition in the marriage contract.
174
 
Hafiz Nazeem Goolam affirms that “the majority of Muslim women around 
the world are unaware of the taqliq or prenuptial agreement. A Muslim woman has 
the right to lay down certain conditions in the taqliq before signing the marriage 
certificate, in order to safeguard her welfare and rights.”175 Examples of these 
conditions vary, under Jordanian law, a wife can restrict her husband from having 
another wife, and in case the husband fails to meet the condition, the woman is 
granted divorce.
176
 
As Nasir affirms it, “like any other contract, a marriage contract can only be 
concluded through the two essentials or pillars (arkan) of offer and acceptance by the 
two principals of their proxies.”177 Concerning the form of the marriage contract, 
jurists agree that it should have “immediate effect, and shall not be suspended or 
deferred to the future.”178 In addition, the woman has the possibility to add conditions 
to the marriage contract.  
To summarize, the issue of polygamy is not as clear-cut as it may seem. From 
a theoretical standpoint, Quranic verses offer a support to both the argument in favor 
and against the issue. It is therefore left to human reasoning and Islamic scholars to 
decide upon its practical implementation. That is the reason why countries apply this 
concept differently.  
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3. Divorce 
A common misunderstanding in western thinking is that the right to divorce vests in 
the husband, but it may be ‘transferred’ to the wife in certain instances.”179 In 
response to this argument, the Quran stipulates that: “And women shall have rights 
similar to the rights against them, according to what is equitable.”180  
In application, Goolam mentions khul’ and Ibn Rushd’s philosophy of it: 
Khul ’is provided for the woman, in opposition to the right of divorce vested 
in the man. Thus if trouble arises from the side of the woman, the man is given 
the power to divorce her, and when injury is received from the man’s side, the 
women is given the right to obtain khul’.181  
 
Nonetheless, in the application of khul’, women lose their financial and 
property rights. And the only possibility of them getting a divorce on equal grounds 
with men is for them to seek judicial interference.  
It is important to add that khul’ is not the only mean by which a woman can dissolve 
the marriage contract. As Mashhour noted, there are three other ways of doing it.
182
 
“Delegated talaq or talaq tafwid” means that “a wife has the right to divorce only if 
the husband has delegated this right to her.”183 This right enables her to end the 
marriage contract at her will. The other forms of divorce, that a woman can initiate, 
are the divorce by judicial interference or divorce when the husband violates a 
condition stipulated in the contract. 
It is possible to argue, from a practical perspective that the rights of women to 
divorce encounter social and administrative obstacles: for example, in case of judicial 
interference, the bureaucratic system of courts might harm her, or that husbands very 
rarely delegate the right to divorce to their wives due to cultural stereotypes. 
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Nonetheless, the point highlighted here is that from a legal perspective Islamic law 
does not prevent women from exercising this right, violations stem from the 
patriarchal system and the social stereotypes that must be overcome for eventual 
change.  
 
4. Inheritance 
Inheritance matters are specific under Islamic law, and the Quranic verse clearly 
stipulates that: 
“Allah (thus) directs you as regards your Children's (Inheritance): to the male, a 
portion equal to that of two females.”184 
Chadhry offers an extensive analysis on inheritance laws under Shari’a. She 
highlights the importance of taking the maqasid or “the intent of the law”185 when 
understanding the above verse, adding that “the ultimate intent of the law is to 
promote and protect the maslaha, the well-being of humanity.”186 The author argues 
that this verse has been abused by the Islamic society to prove men’s superiority. Yet:  
There seems to be a strong case for the proposition that the underlying 
rationale, the ‘illah, of a two to one ratio in estate distribution when male 
agnates and specialized female agnates inherit together, is that the males have 
the great financial responsibilities towards the specialized female agnates with 
whom they inherit, and toward the family in general.
187
 
 
Chadhry presents an important question: with the present social changes 
reforming the family and the role of women in the society, “how would the law 
change”?188 The author offers a very interesting answer: before reinterpreting the 
Quranic verses, which can be a very controversial and debated matter, one should use 
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the mechanisms within Islamic law that can increase women’s property.189 The 
examples given are the “inter vivos gift or hiba”, which gives “great freedom in the 
transfer of property (…) between kin”190 or use “a general Islamic principle [which 
consists in validating] that property owners may freely dispose of their property inter 
vivos.”191 In other words, with the consent of a brother, his sister can inherit as much 
as he does. 
To summarize, inheritance laws, although specific in the Quran, are flexible in 
adapting to the demands of a modern society. It would only require States to 
recognize the other mechanisms found within Islamic jurisprudence to treat men and 
women equally in matters of property and succession. Again, it is important to 
highlight that it is only through knowledge and education that Muslim women will be 
able to understand and voice their rights knowing that their demands do not contradict 
their faith. 
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V. Case Studies: Egypt, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia 
In order to understand the relationship between women’s rights and Islamic law in 
depth, one should analyze its application on a practical level. Therefore, this chapter 
will present the role and place of Shari’a in three different legal systems to highlight 
the immense differences in application and prove that reservations to CEDAW 
invoking Shari’a are void of meaning. The countries presented hereafter are Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and Tunisia. The place given to Shari’a in the Egyptian legal system 
will highlight a stance that is based on a moderate judicial interpretation of religious 
laws. Tunisia will be used as an example of a more progressive and modern 
application of Shari’a, while Saudi Arabia will emphasize the strict and traditional 
application of Islamic law. The analysis of the domestic application of Islamic law 
will then be linked with the CEDAW reservation. 
 
A. Egypt: Balancing between Modern and Traditional Values 
1. Shari’a and Women’s Rights in the Egyptian Legal System 
In order to fully analyze the role of Shari’a in the Egyptian legal system and its 
implications on women’s rights, this part will be divided into two main divisions. A 
general introduction to Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution will first be presented. 
Then cases from the Supreme Constitutional Court, regarding women’s rights will be 
briefed to, finally, highlight the role of the Court in defining Islamic law. This part is 
particularly focused on the national laws of Egypt to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the practice of Islamic law, and to question the validity of Egypt’s 
claim behind its CEDAW reservations.  
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a) Article 2 of the Constitution
192
 
Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution stipulates that “Islam is the Religion of the 
State. Arabic is its official language, and the principles of Islamic Shari’a are the 
principal source of legislation.”193 As Gabr presents it, this provision had undergone 
an amendment in 1980
194. Previously, it stated that “Islam is the religion of the State, 
Arabic is its official language, and the principles of Islamic Shari’a are a principal 
source of legislation.”195 Lombardi questioned “what does it mean for Shari’a to be 
‘the principal source of legislation’?”196 Islamists claimed that this Shari’a is “the 
supreme source”197of legislation, while a more the secularist view understood this 
term as meaning “the preferred form of legislation.”198 Lombardi argues that this was 
not the only controversy generated by the 1980 amendment. In addition, the meaning 
of the term “Shari’a” was left to be defined as well. As Lombardi states it  
Muslims generally agree on vague propositions such as ‘the Shari’a is the law 
revealed to the Prophet and recorded in the sacred literature of Islam’. There 
was, however, no consensus on how one should go about deriving law from 
sacred texts, and consequently there was no consensus on what laws had 
actually been revealed to the Prophet. Thus, there was no workable definition 
of Shari’a that was accepted by all Muslims.199  
 
Nonetheless, faced with these controversies, “The Supreme Constitutional Court 
remains the most authoritative arbiter in these matters.”200 Through its cases, the 
Court was able to define Shari’a and offer answers to the questions Lombardi 
articulated. 
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b) The Supreme Constitutional Court: Defining Islamic Law 
After the amendment of Article 2 of the Constitution, numerous cases were brought 
before the Supreme Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of laws, 
which did not seem, according to the applicants, compatible with Islamic law. The 
first cases were tackled from a procedural perspective, the justices avoided to define 
Islamic law and to be involved in its interpretation. The Ribba Case
201
 is one of the 
examples illustrating how the Court used technical and procedural arguments to avoid 
interpreting Islamic law:  
On 31 May 1980, the President of Al-Azhar University claimed that Article 
226 of the Civil Code, which permitted the payment of interest, was unconstitutional 
since it contradicted Article 2 of the Constitution stipulating that “Islamic Shari’a is 
the primary source of legislation”202. The issue arose when the President of Al-Azhar 
University ordered medical instruments for student use at the Medical faculty and 
refused to pay the creditor the interest rate agreed upon. The Court found that indeed 
legislation should comply with the Constitutional provision, but this obligation did 
not extend to laws issued prior to the 1980 constitutional amendment. And in that 
case, rejected the claimant’s argument, and upheld the payment of interest. 
This case was among the first ones to arise after the amendment and is 
considered to be a precedent in the rulings of the Supreme Constitutional Court. 
Lombardi argues that in this case, “the Court announced the doctrine of non-
retroactivity of Article 2.”203 But it is important to highlight that the religious and 
legal substance were not tackled, the Court merely based its judgement on procedural 
elements. Though tactful, the Court was eventually obliged to define Shari’a and 
                                               
201 Al Mahkama al Dustureya al ‘Ulya [Supreme Constitutional Court] no. 20, 16 May 1985, AL 
Gareeda al Rasmeya 992-1000 (Egypt). 
202 Id. 
203 Lombardi, supra note 196, at 90.  
 53 
interpret it in numerous cases arising after the amendment, such as in the Polygamy 
Case.
204
 
Concerning the facts, a wife, through judicial means, filed for divorce after her 
husband married a second wife. She based her demand on Article 1 of law 100/1985 
stipulating that: 
The husband should declare his social status in the marriage contract.  If he is 
married, he has to declare in the document the name of the wife or wives and 
their addresses.  The notary should notify the wives about the new marriage by 
means of a registered letter.  The wife (ves) over whom the husband got 
married has the right to ask for a divorce if she suffered from a material or 
spiritual harm impeding cohabitation, even if she did not forbid her husband 
from marrying others in the marriage contract.
205
 
 
The husband questioned the constitutionality of the above law, claiming it contradicts 
Article 2 of the constitution, which states that “Islamic Shari’a is the primary source 
of legislation.”206 The husband held that by allowing the first wife to seek divorce, the 
Court prevents him for exercising his right to polygamy. 
In that case, the Supreme Constitutional Court tackles the issue of polygamy and 
enters into a process of religious interpretation (or fiqh). It states that: 
When God allowed polygamy, it was in the interest of human beings and in a 
moderate way.  If the husband could not guarantee the condition of fairness, 
he should marry one woman only. (…). It is impermissible legally for 
polygamy to harm a wife, otherwise it would mean that God’s rules are 
practically harmful.  God, in fact, saw no contradiction between allowing 
polygamy and the opposition of the wife.
207
   
  
In support of this argument, the Court mentioned the Quranic verse concerning 
polygamy, emphasizing the husband’s obligation of fairness. It also referred to the 
general principles embodied in the Sunna such as the principle of “no harm and no 
harming”, which the Maliki School applies in personal status cases. It also elaborated 
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its stance by referring to the Hanbali School, which allows women to stipulate in their 
marriage contract their right to divorce in case their husband takes a second spouse.
208
 
By doing so, the Court pointed out that limitations on polygamy have been accepted 
by the main schools of Islamic jurisprudence. In addition, the Court challenges the 
applicant’s claim arguing that law 100/1985 does not prohibit polygamy since it 
requires that women to prove they endured harm.  
For these reasons, the Court rejects the applicant’s claim and charges him with 
lawyers’ fees.209 
Qualifying the reasoning of the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), 
Lombardi and Brown argue that the Court has been able to balance between liberal 
ideas of public interest and Islamic norms, state that: 
The SCC has combined different approaches to Islamic legal interpretation in 
order to develop a method of interpretation that will be rhetorically attractive 
to a range of Islamists. At the same time, the SCC has articulated the theory in 
such a way that it leaves itself considerable discretion to interpret Islamic law 
in light of its basic assumptions about justice and social utility. Not 
surprisingly, it has exercised its discretion to develop a liberal interpretation of 
Shari’a.210 
 
Concerning the Court’s methodology, Lombardi and Clark emphasize that it considers 
the Quran to be the primary source of Islamic law, but has not defined its stance 
concerning the other sources. The justices abide by “principles that are absolutely 
certain with regard to their authenticity and meaning.”211 In that respect they have 
taken “Rida’s method of establishing textual authenticity”212 and “Sanhuri’s 
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insistence that states are only obliged to respect those principles that have been 
consistently accepted by a critical mass of traditional jurists over centuries.”213 
To illustrate their argument, Clark and Lombardi mention the 1996 Case on Veiling 
when the Minister of Education issued a decision forbidding school girls to wear the 
niqqab (full veil, covering face and hands) and a father challenged the 
constitutionality of the decision, arguing it contradicts Article 2 of the constitution. 
The Court starts by referring to the Quranic verses, which are not certain in their 
meaning. Therefore, “the decision is not ipso facto contrary to Shari’a.”214 Then the 
Court offered an interpretation to the general objective and goals of veils, concluding 
that it promotes “modesty”215. In that respect, “it suggested that unveiled faces do not 
promote lewd behaviour and might actually prevent it.”216 In addition, the Court 
covered the social costs of veiling arguing that “it is concerned with the consequences 
if conservatives, by forcing their daughters to veil their faces, impeded their ability to 
work and engage in public activities.”217 Therefore, the Court rejects the applicant’s 
claim. 
Thus one can not classify the Court’s methodology as fitting into the ijtihad, 
the taqlid or the utilitarian approach, as presented in Chapter IV, since it partially 
borrows ideas from them all to reach a relatively well-balanced output, balancing 
between the religious norms and “human interests.”218 The Supreme Constitutional 
Court’s progressive application of Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution proves how 
flexible and evolving Islamic law is. The justices were able, in several instances, to 
defend and promote women’s rights through Shari’a based arguments. 
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2. Egypt’s Reservations to CEDAW 
In relation to the application of Islamic law in its national system, Egypt made two 
reservations to CEDAW invoking Shari’a as their justification. 
a) Article 2 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Article 2 is primarily concerned with policy measures that 
states should undertake to ensure the protection and promotion of women’s rights219. 
The Article mentions the need for legislative reform as well as the obligation of states: 
“[T]o refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against 
women”220. Egypt made a reservation to this Article claiming that “the Arab Republic 
of Egypt is willing to comply with the content of this article, provided that such 
compliance does not run counter to the Islamic Shari’a.221 
The above reservations does not precise the reasons why Islamic law could be 
incompatible with Article 2. And most critiques mention the general and imprecise 
nature of this reservation. Brandt and Kaplan argue that “although Egypt did not 
submit reservations to every provision of the Convention that conflicts with Shari’a, 
Egypt’s reservation to Article 2 exempts Egypt from abiding by any obligation or 
duty that does contradict Islamic law.”222 The authors also quote Jenefsky who adds 
that “Egypt’s broad reservation to Article 2 is incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the Women’s Convention.”223 
Nonetheless, as highlighted in Chapter 2, Article 2 itself is broad and general, 
statements such as the obligation of states to take “all appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices 
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which constitute discrimination against women”224 are indeed imprecise. Whether 
religion is included in the term “customs and practices” or not is not clear. No further 
explanation is offered in the Committee’s General Comments about this term’s scope. 
Thus, one is faced with a conflict of rights: should women’s rights supersede cultural 
and religious rights? And, in any case, who defines the balance between them? The 
question should be answered by societal needs and public interest. As it was presented 
in Chapter IV, public interest is a source of Islamic law, which makes it very flexible. 
Islamic law is moulded by the demands of the society, thus an increase of education 
and awareness would emancipate women and lead them to demand their rights, a 
process that would lead to a reinterpretation of Islamic law. 
b) Article 16 
Article 16 focuses on “matters relating to marriage and family relations.”225 It tackles 
issues of guardianship, rights in marriage, divorce, property rights and adoption. 
Egypt states that: 
Reservation to the text of article 16, concerning the equality of men and 
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations during the 
marriage and upon its dissolution, without prejudice to the Islamic Sharia's 
provisions whereby women are accorded rights equivalent to those of their 
spouses so as to ensure a just balance between them. This is out of respect for 
the sacrosanct nature of the firm religious beliefs which govern marital 
relations in Egypt and which may not be called in question and in view of the 
fact that one of the most important bases of these relations is an equivalency of 
rights and duties so as to ensure complementary which guarantees true 
equality between the spouses. The provisions of the Sharia lay down that the 
husband shall pay bridal money to the wife and maintain her fully and shall 
also make a payment to her upon divorce, whereas the wife retains full rights 
over her property and is not obliged to spend anything on her keep. The Sharia 
therefore restricts the wife's rights to divorce by making it contingent on a 
judge's ruling, whereas no such restriction is laid down in the case of the 
husband.
226
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Egypt’s reservation is based on the argument that Islamic law defines equality 
between spouses, dividing rights and obligations among them. It also states clearly 
that “religious beliefs govern marital relations in Egypt.”227 This reservation is clearer 
than Article 2, both the Article and the reservation are specific in the issue they tackle. 
Brandt and Kaplan cite Abdullahi An-Na’im, who argues that “Egypt would not have 
bothered to enter a reservation on Article 16 if it had no intention to comply.”228 It 
other words, this reservation does not necessarily reflect bad faith from Egypt’s side, 
this reservation might be a tool used in favour of gradual progress in the field of 
personal status law. 
To sum up, scholars agree that the diverse methodologies used by the Supreme 
Constitutional Court to interpret Islamic law do not offer a consistent framework.
229
 
Nonetheless, Venkatraman adds that “[r]eservations to the Women’s Convention 
based on Shari’a lose their relevancy in light of Egypt’s selective, results-oriented, 
albeit important, reforms.”230 The author recommends that Egypt follows the example 
of Tunisia and Morocco and to pursue its process of reform.
231
 Although Egypt’s 
reservation to article 2 is regarded as invalid, it can be argued that Egypt’s reservation 
to article 16 is valid to a certain extent, since national personal status laws will only 
be compatible with the Convention after they undergo a process of reform. In other 
words, even if the SCC’s interpretation and judgements are progressive and moderate, 
the formulation of the law itself does not protect women’s rights. To achieve a reform 
within the laws themselves, a societal demand must rise. Through educational 
developments, women should be able to voice their rights and acquire them. 
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Reinterpretation of Islamic law will be initiated from that point, but it is important to 
take into consideration that these reforms are a “bottom-up” process and not a “top-
down” one. In other words, the international community will never be able to impose 
upon the Egyptian society what it refuses to abide by; changes need to arise from the 
society. The latest example illustrating this process is the Personal Status Law of 2000 
(khul’ law) allowing women to divorce without the consent of their husbands. Amira 
Mashhour argues that “it was a reflection of the rising powers of the women’s and 
human rights organizations during the 1990s.”232 
 
B. Tunisia: The Progressive Application of Islamic Law 
1. Shari’a and Women’s Rights in the Tunisian Legal System 
In Egypt, the interpretation of Islamic law is reflected in the application of the law, 
from the judgements of the Supreme Constitutional Court, whereas in Tunisia the 
interpretation of Shari’a is reflected in the articulation of the law itself. For this 
reason, the below section will emphasize how Tunisia has used Islamic law as a 
source of legislation, but offers a strong legal framework to protect women’s rights. In 
its reservations to CEDAW, Tunisia does not refer to Shari’a, it merely cites its 
national legislation and argues that these reservations are temporary.
233
 The objective 
of analyzing this country is to demonstrate how Islamic law is not contradictory to 
women’s rights or to the adherence to CEDAW provisions. 
a) The Personal Status Code of 1956 
The Personal Status Code of 1956 introduced major reforms in the field of family law, 
and rearticulated women’s rights in more progressive and liberal terms. Among the 
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important changes, polygamy was abolished.
234
 Moreover, it put an end to the form of 
divorce, which is unilaterally pronounced by the husband, Kaplan adds that: “Women 
possess equal rights to file for divorce on the same basis and conditions as men. Upon 
divorce, custody of children may be granted to either spouse, based on the best 
interest of the child.”235 
 These reforms succeeded for numerous factors. First, “President 
Bourguiba’s moral authority as a historical figure of the independence movement, 
contributed to the popular support and societal legitimacy [which was] enjoyed by 
these reforms.”236 The second reason was the “mobilization of socialist forces at the 
grassroots level”237, which was engaged in numerous educational and training 
programs aiming at increasing awareness among women.
238
 Last but not least the 
reforms also enjoyed an “Islamic legitimacy”239 since they were “innovative 
reinterpretations of religious laws.”240 Although a rise of a more conservative and 
traditionalist mentality at the end of the 1960s was notable, these reforms maintain 
their impact since they enjoyed a societal legitimacy.
241
 Amira Mashhour affirms that 
“the importance of the Tunisian model stems from the fact that the Personal Status 
Code in Tunisia is based on Islamic law and the spirit of the Quran and Sunna 
regarding gender equality.”242 She adds that the Shari’a is an important source of 
legislation.
243
 Yet, it is important to highlight that the Personal Status Code of 1956 
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was a tool to develop the society, a modernizing force of change.”244 In other words, 
the reforms were led by a political will to protect and promote women’ rights. 
b) Redefining Islamic Law 
The reforms mentioned above were justified and supported by a reinterpretation of 
Islamic law. An-Na’im uses the example of the Tunisian reforms in the Personal 
Status Code of 1965 to illustrate how polygamy can be restricted.
245
 To support this 
reform, the government offered several arguments: 
(1) Polygamy, like slavery, was an institution whose past purpose as no longer 
acceptable to most people; and (2) the ideal of the Quran was monogamy. 
Here [a reformist position] was espoused, namely that the Quranic permission 
to take up to four wives (IV: 3) was seriously qualified by verse 129: “Ye are 
never able to be fair and just between women even if that were your ardent 
desire” (IV: 129). Thus, polygamy was permitted, the Quranic ideal is 
monogamy.
246
  
 
Hallaq argues that although these reforms reflect a form of reasoning or ijtihad, it is 
no way similar to the classical form of ijtihad.
247
 While Kaplan states that “Tunisia 
has followed the Islamic interpretative practice of takkhayur, or choosing the most 
suitable existing jurisprudence from among Islamic schools.”248 In any case, the 
method of interpretation, as Hallaq presents it, is not consistent: “[i]t goes without 
saying that neither this quasi-ijtihad nor the device of selection and amalgamation are 
sustained by any type of cohesive legal methodology.”249  
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2. Tunisia’s Reservations to CEDAW 
Tunisia has made three reservations and two declarations to CEDAW
250
: on Article 9 
referring to nationality laws, on Article 29, which focuses on the arbitration system of 
CEDAW in cases of dispute and on Article 16 on personal status. A general 
declaration was made, as well as a declaration with regards to Article 15 paragraph 4, 
concerning choosing the place of residence. 
 None of these reservations or declarations refers to Islamic law. As 
a matter of fact, the only justification given is “national legislation”, in specific 
reference is made to the Personal Status Code and the Constitution
251
. The absence of 
reference to Islam helps demonstrate that, in light of a progressive interpretation of 
Shari’a, reservations invoking Islamic law are unnecessary. Thus, it is the 
interpretation of Islamic law that might represent an obstacle to the implementation of 
CEDAW, not the law itself.  
 Yet, as an exception to the general trend in Tunisia’s modern 
interpretation, the issue of inheritance seems to directly link its stance with Islamic 
law. The reservation made to Article 16 stipulates that: 
The Tunisian Government considers itself not bound by article 16, paragraphs 
(c), (d) and (f) of the Convention and declares that paragraphs (g) and (h) of 
that article must not conflict with the provisions of the Personal Status Code 
concerning the granting of family names to children and the acquisition of 
property through inheritance.
252
 
 
Going back to the Code on Personal Status, it specifically states that in inheritance 
matters, it entirely follows the Maliki School of thought.
253
 The latter abides by the 
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two to one ratio between men and women in inheritance issues. Yet, it is important to 
note that inheritance is among the most controversial issues in Islamic jurisprudence, 
and that it would require immense scholarly work to reach a compromise between the 
Quranic verses and women’s equality. 
Nonetheless, with reference to the reports submitted to the Committee, Kaplan argues 
that “Tunisia states that its reservations ‘must be regarded as temporary until various 
provisions of the Convention can be fully integrated into existing Tunisian 
legislation’. Since CEDAW does not require immediate compliance but simply a 
commitment to advance toward its goal ‘without delay’, Tunisia’s reservations, 
admittedly temporary, would seem unnecessary.”254 In other words, there is not a 
direct conflict between national legislation and international norms, these reservations 
are not justified.  
 To conclude, Venkatraman argues that the Personal Status Code 
does not contradict Article 16, thus “Tunisia’s reservations to Article 16 seem 
impermissibly formulated and substantively unnecessary.”255 Kaplan adds that these 
reservations create a “perception of resistance and non-compliance”256, which he 
argues is more damaging to CEDAW than it is useful.
257
 
As a matter of fact, the reservations which are indirectly linked to Islamic law are the 
least problematic among Tunisia’s reservations. The one concerning nationality law 
might generate more debate and questions.
258
 For the purpose of this thesis, Tunisia 
offers an example of how a progressive interpretation of Islamic law can promote 
women’s rights. Whether women’s rights are respected or not on a practical basis, is 
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not the core of the argument here, but Islamic law does not seem to represent an 
obstacle to the general objective of protecting women’s rights. 
 
III- Saudi Arabia: The Traditional Application of Islamic Law 
1- Shari’a and Women’s Rights in the Saudi Legal System 
Although Saudi Arabia claims its constitution to be the Quran, it follows a document 
named “Basic Law of Government”259, which was adopted by Royal decree in 1993 
by King Fahd. Article 1 of the Basic Law states that: 
“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its 
religion; God's Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet, God's prayers and peace be upon 
him, are its constitution…”260 
Islamic law is applied in all the fields of public and private life. Concerning human 
rights, Article 26 emphasizes that, “The state protects human rights in accordance 
with the Islamic Shari'ah.”261 No detail is given on the application of Shari’a. As a 
matter of fact, Sifa Mtango adds that, “the Basic Law is also silent on women’s rights. 
The government appointed clergy, and the Government as a whole, interpret Shari’a 
so as to permit the denial of certain rights to women.”262 In other words, the issue of 
women’s rights is left to the government to interpret and define without any legal 
protection. 
 Concerning the school of thought followed in Saudi Arabia, Frank 
Vogel states that “Saudi Arabia (…) acknowledged the Hanbali School.”263 The 
Hanbali School predominantly depends on the literal meaning of the Quranic verses 
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and reject both “free exercise of personal opinion”264 and the “use of analogical and 
systematic reasoning.”265 Hallaq argues that: 
 The traditional group, represented, among others, by the official advocates of 
the Saudi regime, which aims at applying the Shari’a in it presumably intact, 
puritanist traditional form, notwithstanding the reformist spirit of Wahhabism. 
(…) Despite their unanimous proclamation of the right to exercise ijtihad, they 
mostly stressed the need to return to the pristine religious forms of the first 
Islamic generation.
266
  
 
 In other words, as presented in the previous case studies, as well as 
in Chapter 3, it is within the possibility of interpretation that one is able to articulate 
women’s rights in a modern and progressive way. By refusing the means of 
interpretation (ijtihad), the Saudi system confines itself to a rigid application of 
women’s rights, which seem to contradict the overarching principle of equality in 
Islamic law. 
 
2- Saudi Arabia’s Reservations to CEDAW 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has made a general reservations to CEDAW, which 
stipulate that: 
“1. In case of contradiction between any term of the Convention and the norms of 
Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe the contradictory terms 
of the Convention.”267 
The above reservation applies to all the provisions of the Convention in case 
they would contradict Islamic law, such a reservation categorically contradicts the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and seems to defeat both “the object and 
purpose” of the Convention. This type of ratification seems to question not only the 
protection of women’s rights in Saudi Arabia, but challenges the efficiency of the 
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Convention and the Committee. In addition, Saudi Arabia has not submitted any 
reports to the CEDAW Committee, which is a clear and obvious sign of its 
unwillingness to comply with any of its duties towards women’s rights.  
 To conclude, As Sifa Mtango puts it: 
Women in Saudi Arabia live under constant legal and cultural prohibitions, 
whether in the family or outside their homes. The restrictions imposed by the 
state in its laws and decrees are oppressive, but the support these laws obtain 
from the patriarchal structure in their society means that improving their status 
is not just a matter of legal and political reform, but will also require 
considerable social change.
268
 
 
 As already noted above, social changes are at the core of women’s 
emancipation and equality. Moreover, the interpretation of Islamic law depends on 
these societal elements as well as on political motivations. In short, it is not Shari’a 
per se that violates women’s rights, but its interpretation, which can be guided by 
motives other than the “general good”. 
 Back to the reservations, should Saudi Arabia’s ratification to the 
Convention be considered as void? Goodman argues that “the harm to state consent in 
voiding its membership in a treaty will outweigh the harm in voiding only the 
reservation and keeping the state bound.”269 Thus as the author argues, “the 
appropriate test for determining whether a reservation is severable turns on an intent-
based inquiry.”270 An essential part of this inquiry depends on “the structure of 
conditional consent”,271 which takes as an assumption that a state tries to “promote 
women’s rights”272 while limiting the treaty’s interference in domestic matters.273 In 
the case of Saudi Arabia, an additional challenge emerges in defining women’s rights. 
Saudi Arabia, following a traditional application of Islamic law claims to apply 
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human rights according to it. In addition, it is important to keep into consideration that 
considering a reservation to be valid or not is distanced from the practical protection 
and promotion of women’s rights. These ones should be claimed and demanded on a 
national level, to be supported internationally.  
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 VI. Conclusion and Recommendations 
When questioning the validity of the reservations invoking Islamic law to CEDAW, 
one engages in a multi-dimensional analysis. At a theoretical level, Shari’a is not a 
valid justification behind the reservations to CEDAW, fiqh might be. In other words, 
it is the interpretation of Islamic law, which is amalgamated with customary norms, 
traditions and political motivations that one might find areas of contradiction between 
the applied Islamic law and women’s rights. But at a practical level, the international 
community will not be able to enforce international norms upon communities that 
hold embedded beliefs and rooted traditions. State sovereignty remains the pillar of 
international law. So how can CEDAW be implemented and how can it promote 
women’s rights in the specific cases mentioned above? 
 A step forward would be for countries to submit reports to the 
Committee clearly specifying how Islam contradicts the reserved provisions. This 
requirement would limit the number of reservations and would nullify reservations 
such as Egypt’s reservation to Article 2, which is broad, as well as Saudi Arabia’s 
general reservation which is self-defeating. The question deriving from this first 
recommendation would be: what if states are able to prove incompatibility? 
Goodman’s “intent-based”274 inquiry might be a solution to such a question as 
presented in Chapter 4. But most importantly, the State report justifying the need for a 
reservation will generate a dialogue, a debate among Islamic scholars, international 
organizations and politicians. As presented throughout this thesis, different 
interpretations exist, and for a report to be issued with precise detail, other institutions 
will be able to challenge it and offer alternatives. This can also lead to an increase in 
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awareness among Islamic societies and Muslim women, which leads to the second 
recommendation: 
 Raising awareness on women’s rights should become a priority in 
Muslim countries. These rights are violated and abused in the name of religion. To 
achieve a progressive and modern interpretation of the law, women need to voice their 
demands, knowing that these ones do not undermine their faith. It is only through an 
“upward” process, a demand stemming from the society itself that progress can be 
achieved. The role of civil society becomes crucial in initiating this process and 
promoting a new understanding of gender equality.  
 
 
